Interview with Wendell W. Woodbury

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

WENDELL W. WOODBURY

Interviewed by: Virginia Crawford

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Q: Could you give us a little background on your early life? Where and when you were born and your early education.

WOODBURY: I was born in northeastern South Dakota in the hamlet of Crocker. That area was made famous by the distinguished professor from Wisconsin, Turner, with his “last frontier” thesis. It was the last area where one hundred and sixty acres of free land could be homesteaded profitably. My maternal grandfather, from Norway, was one of the last of the original homesteaders in 1888. That is also where my mother was born. I used to mention that she was born in a sod hut, but when she heard me say that once she said indignantly that I was entirely wrong. Her older brothers were born in a sod hut but she insisted she was born in a respectable frame house. She didn't realize that I was boasting.

Q: What year were you born?

WOODBURY: 1920.

Q: Where did you get your early schooling?

WOODBURY: I went to the Crocker school—Crocker was founded in 1910—for eight years. It had two rooms so I couldn't even say that I had gone to a one room school. We had no high school there; in fact we had no electricity or running water. The town was built when the railway came through and like most everything else out in the high plains it expanded rapidly until the agricultural depression of the twenties, the big depression hit in the thirties along with the devastating drought. It was a very prosperous area to begin with and my grandfather became quite a well to do farmer because there happened to be very high prices for grain during World War I and some time before. Crocker was founded in 1910 and it almost immediately started declining. It had three saloons at one time, a newspaper, two banks, a dance hall, three general stores, and five grain elevators. By the time I was growing up most were empty buildings. This experience made me a life-long pessimist.

Q: Then you didn't go to high school there?

WOODBURY: No. There never was a high school. My older brother went to a school eight miles away. I was delayed in getting to high school because I was sick a year with rheumatic fever and then moved. My father was a railway agent and when they closed the station at Crocker because there was no business he used his seniority and chose to go to Iowa where it rained more often. He picked a place that had a good high school for his children—five boys. That is how I ended up in Corwith, Iowa from where I was appointed to the career service. I maintained my residence there until my retirement in 1980 out of loyalty.

Q: That is where you went to high school?

WOODBURY: That's right. From there I went to the University of Iowa in 1939. I was followed at Iowa by my three younger brothers, all of whom received their B.A.s and M.A.s there on the GI Bill as did my older brother at Berkeley. All my graduate education was courtesy of Uncle Sam as well.

Q: If that was in 1939 you must have been there when World War II started?

WOODBURY: Yes, I was. The war in Europe started the day I left for college in 1939. I took advanced ROTC because I was certain we were going to be in the war. I graduated a semester early in December 1942 because by that time we were deeply into the war and I felt rather guilty about not being in it so I went to summer school and entered the Army six months earlier than most of my classmates. Eventually all five brothers were in the armed forces, three of whom served overseas.

Q: Were you deferred because you were taking ROTC?

WOODBURY: Yes. We didn't get commissions but we were sent to Officer's Candidate School in Fort Benning, Georgia beginning January 2 of 1943. I got through that by hook or crook in April and became a second lieutenant in the infantry. I would have much preferred a more pleasant way of life but I was precluded from the glamour of aviation or of the navy because I was color blind.

Q: Where did you go after you got your commission?

WOODBURY: I was assigned to a newly organized division assembling in the Willamette Valley in Oregon, the 70th Infantry. It is a beautiful place in the summer but in the winter it is cold, foggy, and rainy most of the time but I spent almost half my time there in the high desert of central Oregon.

Q: What were your duties?

WOODBURY: I was an infantry platoon leader. I had almost every kind of platoon, mortars, machine guns, then later rifles. The problems of trying to organize a new division —they told us we had to be ready to fight the Germans or Japanese within a year, which I thought was sheer madness because the average officer had been in the army less than a year and the average non-com, of the few we had, had been in less than six months. The

rest were draftees or “fillers” as they were called. It was absolute confusion. I remember trying to teach sixty men how to infiltrate a heavy mortar platoon through woods or jungle on a parade ground as flat and bare as this floor; the platoon sergeant and I were the only ones who had ever seen a mortar. I didn't even have a picture of one to show the draftees. I complained to one of my superiors about that and he said, “Lieutenant, use your imagination, improvise.” So I then realized that the United States Army was mad and you just had to go along with it. But as one of my friends said, “We won the war didn't we.”

Q: So you were there approximately a year?

WOODBURY: No, after six months I volunteered for overseas service. I was always being detailed to temporary duty so I spent much time away and every time I came back I had a different platoon. They used these training divisions as a source of replacements. So I went to the Pacific, to Hawaii to a replacement depot with five hundred first and second lieutenants. They had expected heavy casualties at Kwajalein based on the Marines' experience on Tarawa. We had very few casualties, however, because we had learned how to do it, so they took half the surplus officers and sent them to MacArthur in New Guinea where they went directly into the front lines. They went by the alphabet, A to K to MacArthur and the second half stayed in Hawaii. I went to the Seventh Division on Oahu. It had just returned from Kwajalein, so I had another six months of non-combat infantry duty with the 17th Infantry which became my specialty.

Q: What did you do there?

WOODBURY: I had a rifle platoon which had been in combat twice; a very relaxed organization, a lot of good feeling. They had been together about three years. Because they had miscalculated resulting in a surplus of lieutenants in the central theater, we were up for grabs. They discovered that I had a college degree, which was extremely rare among second lieutenants in those days. We were establishing another logistics command in Hawaii to handle the Army operations in the central Pacific under Admiral

Nimitz—Nimitz had his own army just as MacArthur had his own navy. So I became part of Nimitz's army. When I was interviewed for the job I never thought I would get it because I was only twenty-three years old and the only experience I had had outside of the army was as foreman of a dishwashing crew at the University of Iowa hospital. My competition was a lawyer who was thirty-two years old. I suppose I was more trainable, for to my great surprise I was transferred there as a general staff officer. I had to ask the only other second lieutenant there what a general staff does. I'm still not sure.

After another six months in the Central Pacific Base Command I volunteered again; by that time I was a trained general staff officer in logistics; one learned fast in those days. I had learned the different logistics systems for the army and the navy because we were under overall navy command and the ground forces were a mixture of marines and army, even the languages used were different. So in January I went to the Tenth Army, which was to take Okinawa; because of my understanding of our hybrid logistic system, however I never got to Okinawa until the war was over. I stayed on Okinawa until the last of April, 1946—I wasn't actually on Okinawa but was supply officer for the garrison force on Ie Shimada where Ernie Pyle was killed. It was also the closest territory to Tokyo that we had taken.

Q: When you were discharged in 1946 did you have plans to further your education on the GI Bill?

WOODBURY: Oh yes but I resisted the idea. I was twenty-six when I was discharged as a captain; I had been overseas for twenty-seven months and wanted to live the good life for a while so I really resisted going back to school, I wasn't anxious to return to the classroom and library but I found out that a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of Iowa didn't open many doors for you nor did amphibious logistics. I realized I had to go to graduate school. Of course the GI Bill was a tremendous opportunity not to be missed. I decided I would stay in economics.

There was one major influence in Okinawa that I have left out. In the last months, there was nothing to do. It was a miserable place, it was like living in a charnel house; there were a quarter of a million people killed there in a small area. There was nothing left but mines, shell holes and dust (or mud), and about half a million Okinawans who had survived held in concentration camps. The University of the Ryukyus was established for service men who wanted to expand their education and I made several friends there on the faculty. One was a middle-aged (over thirty) signal corps officer who was a Harvard graduate. He suggested that I ought to apply to Harvard after I got back, and I did and was accepted to my surprise. I spent a semester at the University of Chicago first because I didn't hear from Harvard immediately. After two and a half years there I passed my generals for the Ph.D. After four years absence from academic work, it was a difficult and grinding effort but I took the time to court my wife Elizabeth Delano, who was an undergraduate at Radcliffe. We were married in Tokyo October 9, 1950.

Q: Had you had a notion that you wanted to join the Foreign Service long before?

WOODBURY: Not really, I just took advantage of an opportunity open to all to take the FSO exam as a hedge. I intended to teach, to finish my Ph.D. dissertation and become an assistant professor somewhere. But then I also found out that economics had become very mathematical and I had limited mathematics, just barely enough to get through. I had to teach myself differential calculus to understand statistics and courses in theory. I realized I had to go back and take several years of mathematics or be obsolete at the age of thirty. After I passed the Foreign Service exam, I was called for the oral and passed that too but I thought I could leave it open because it took about a year in those days to get in after passing the exam. Unfortunately, I was called into the Foreign Service just before December 1948 when I was due for my generals. I got a delay because if I had gone in then I would have thrown away that two and a half years of hard work. So they extended me for the next class which they thought would be the next summer. So I started a Ph.D. dissertation just in case I changed my mind again, and I was called up in June of 1949.

After at least a decade in the Foreign Service, I remembered the professor of European history had recommended I apply for the Foreign Service because of my aptitude for history. It seemed so farfetched, I immediately forgot to, but times changed.

Q: So you were in the Foreign Service class of 1949. What could you tell us about the class, its composition, outlook, etc.?

WOODBURY: I think there were about twenty-five or so in the class. Only about fourteen or fifteen were career Foreign Service officers.

Q: Were there women among those?

WOODBURY: There were four women who became Foreign Service officers, a record at that time, only one survived the first assignment. The other three were married, and they then had to resign. The survivor attained the rank of Ambassador four times, and retired just recently—Patricia Byrne. One of the women, Lucille McHenry, married a classmate, Cleo Noel, who was at Harvard with me. After his tragic murder by PLO terrorists in the Sudan and her children were older, she accepted reappointment in the FSO corps. The last time I saw Lucille, she was sternly lecturing Under Secretary Habib that if he wanted his staff promoted, he had to get their ERs in on time.

Q: Were there other minorities in the class?

WOODBURY: Well, I always considered myself one being from the rural Midwest. Maybe, Phil Habib; he was treated like a minority because he was Lebanese. It was mostly a white, male group, probably Protestant. Most of the males and one of the females were veterans so we were older than many, between twenty-five and thirty-five. One of the women became a Danish countess—certainly a minority on several counts. (No pun intended)

Q: What training did your class receive?

WOODBURY: In those days, before the cone system, junior officers were expected to do consular work, so we got heavy training in that: visas, passports, immigration, citizenship questions, etc. We had some economic training which Phil Habib and I thought was pretty jejune. For creative writing we were told to count the parts of speech and work toward the ideal proportions which I thought a bit weird.

Q: Did you find this training, such as it was, of some help to you in your career?

WOODBURY: Not really. I think there was a cultural and generational problem there. First, we were older and most had had a lot of responsibility before. As a platoon leader and a general staff officer, I probably had much more responsibility in the Army than I did for my first years in the Foreign Service. Phil Habib was a captain in the Army engineers building temporary airfields right behind the lines in Europe; another member was a major in the Air Force in charge of all the weather service in the Mediterranean; we had a decorated artillery officer, the Silver Star, who was a forward observer in Europe and has just published a book about it; a couple of Navy officers who had commanded small ships. Many of us believed that we were talked down to by the lecturers and especially by FSO's about our age who had spent World War II in such hot spots as Costa Rica. There was also a certain generational conflict. I myself thought after the first euphoria about being admitted to “the elite service” wore off that the members of the examining board for the orals were stuffy, naive, knew very little about the U.S. and showed a very remarkable cultural bias for representatives abroad for all Americans. My classmate Phil Habib and I agreed that the FSO in charge of economic training in FSI was a pompous ass whose knowledge of the subject would not get him a passing grade in a good ECON A undergraduate course.

I knew our mentor my last year at Harvard and never saw him take a note or participate in seminars. A dean at what is now called the Kennedy School told me later that the Harvard

faculty was seriously considering not accepting any more FSO's for economic training because most of them did not have the academic training to benefit from graduate work.

I was amused that even after he had become an ambassador, Habib never forgot our “advisor.” Phil had just been awarded his Ph.D. from California in economics that summer. At a “seminar” about the current economy by our professor, Phil took a mild and respectful (for Phil) exception to the politically current line on economic policy only to be told that junior officers were to be seen and not heard. When Phil was appointed Ambassador to Korea, I asked if he was going to ask for this obscure officer as his Economic Counselor, he erupted violently until he realized I was teasing him.

Q: What do you mean by cultural bias?

WOODBURY: It has been over a year since I gave this interview and I had to think hard why I was so vehement because these biases such as still existed never had an important impact on my career or personal relations. But we were talking about 45 years ago, not now. The cultural bias was to white upper middle class; east coast, good family, private university snobbishness. To put it bluntly, many of us were rather unimpressed by the State Department and the “elitism” claimed by the Foreign Service. There are many brilliant individuals and the average is high for a government agency but that is largely irrelevant because we have conceded to other agencies a lion's share of foreign policy. The country team concept and the political ambassador patronage system puts an impossible burden on the Foreign Service to excel and lead. As Napoleon said about the British regiment to their front at Waterloo, “The best cavalry in Europe—and the worst lead.”

I realize that I have often mentioned Phil Habib in this interview, and I know that one cannot speak for the dead. I believe he had died shortly before this interview so a flood of memories of 45 years ago came back. He was my best friend in our class and our paths kept crossing even after he became mythic. I do think it useful to recall that before he was

canonized, the way was not made smooth for him nor was he welcomed into the exclusive club with open arms.

I first met Phil when the class of 1949 met in July 1949. Our common interests deepened into a long term friendship, in part because we thought a lot alike and we shared fairly rough backgrounds—by Foreign Service standards only. In comparing notes with Phil, I said I was irritated by my orals board when they grilled me about my Norwegian grandparents and my South Dakota birthplace. I never knew my grandmother, and my grandfather died when I was eight so neither was a seminal influence in my life to my regret. I actually had little interest in Norway until World War II.

The chairman informed me later that despite some doubts about a Norwegian accent some had heard they had passed me. Years later my “pronounced mid-Western accent” was mentioned as a criticism in an ER so I suspect that is what the board thought they heard. At that time I thought it grotesque because I could not speak a word of Norwegian. And after all, we are a nation of immigrants. My father's English speaking forebears landed on Cape Ann in New England in 1624, while my Norwegian grandparents settled in Dakota Territory in 1880. What weight did one give—plus or minus—to refugees from the Norwegian diaspora as compared to refugees from English religious wars?

In relating his experience, Phil said I was lucky because I had vaguely blue eyes and a respectable WASP name while he had an Arab/Jewish name with the map of the Middle East on his face. His board had really worked him over about his origins even questioning his command of Arabic. His chairman let him know that they had reluctantly accepted him as the first Arab American FSO but he must understand he could never serve in the Middle East. That vastly amused me when in the 1980's he shuffled between Tel Aviv and Damascus in trying to get the PLO out of Lebanon. At the time he told me that he was the only American both Begin and Assad would speak to. I'm sure Phil was not oblivious to the irony but he never mentioned it to me again.

Our experience with the oral boards in 1949 made me wonder just what was the paradigm of a model American diplomat in those days. I asked a slightly younger friend from Galesburg, Illinois at the last Foreign Service Day, about his experience. He said his oral board must have made a close ethnic study of Galesburg because they asked him if he identified with the Irish or Swedish communities there. He had a bemused smile as if to say he hadn't figured out the answer yet. Another classmate of mine and Phil's volunteered that his board wondered how he had ever heard of the U.S. Foreign Service in Nebraska. He had been an infantry platoon leader in combat in Europe and had spent most of the interim in the graduate school of the University of Chicago.

Q: Your first assignment was Tokyo. Were you given any choice in that assignment?

WOODBURY: Yes, some choice. I was very much interested in the Marshall Plan in Europe and I assumed that because I had so much training in that area the Foreign Service would consider me for a position where I could use it. Incurably naive! Hence, I put down Europe first, then Latin America because I thought Spanish would be easier to learn and I am not a great linguist, and last Japan. I had spent three years working to defeat the Japanese Empire, but I had never gotten there (except Okinawa). Perhaps, because it was the only specific country requested, I was assigned to Japan, something that I hadn't really thought much about even though my war-time service was directed there.

The occupation was still in force and was the entire time I was there. If I had thought about that, I probably wouldn't have gone. I had already served under General MacArthur as a soldier. They had the Office of the Political Advisor from State, but MacArthur wouldn't allow it to be called that; he called it the Diplomatic Section of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, his Foreign Office so to speak. He wasn't about to take advice from anybody, especially the State Department. There was really no role for us to play except for the consulates doing consular work and routine liaison with foreign missions. I helped eight hundred G.I.'s marry Japanese girls, and then I issued two thousand visas to Japanese wives and their children after I went down to Yokohama. SCAP was very upset

by the thought that we might be doing any political or economic reporting not under their control. Our role as the nucleus of the future U.S. Embassy was especially troubling as a threat to their pleasant life.

Q: So there was no embassy there because it was under occupation and you just had the consular functions?

WOODBURY: It wasn't quite like that. In Europe, you may recall, the State Department ended up running Germany. So far as I know this worked relatively smoothly as the military was glad to give up the political functions. But not MacArthur, it was his world out there; he was the blue-eyed Shogun. So after a year in Tokyo, I asked to go to Yokohama. There I did consular work only, a sort of hazing process to teach us humility. It was interesting applying the 1940 immigration act to Japan. It didn't go into effect until January 1, 1942, just after Pearl Harbor. There were many questions of comparative law because the Japanese had no nationality law per se; the Japanese are Japanese are Japanese and everyone knows they are Japanese. There was no requirement, for example, that you had to be a Japanese citizen to be Emperor or Prime Minister. According to United States law, if you had dual citizenship and accepted a job of trust where you had to take an oath of allegiance to a foreign government, you were expatriated. Such a concept was completely unknown to the Japanese, one race, one people, one nation, and one language.

Q: Could we just get your dates straightened out. You went to Tokyo in 1949?

WOODBURY: Late 1949, just in time for Thanksgiving.

Q: You stayed in Tokyo about a year?

WOODBURY: Yes. Then I went to Yokohama at my request because I wanted to get married and they didn't have housing in Tokyo but they did in Yokohama.

I took the job of a language officer who was going up to the consulate in Hokkaido. I took over his job, his house and his staff of five servants who were furnished us by the Army. Incidentally, he was a Harvard law graduate and his legal training was put to good use. He did some very complex work in comparative law on nationality questions while he was a very junior officer, a third secretary and a vice-consul (Richard B. Finn), relating to the initial application of 1940 U.S. Immigration Act. His daughter also graduated from Harvard Law 40 years later and he was wryly amused that her entry salary was higher than his FSO-1 final salary.

Q: What was the situation in Japan at that time? It was still under the occupation.

WOODBURY: Just a week after we left in April 1952, the occupation ended officially. When I arrived there in 1949 Japan was still devastated; Yokohama was almost destroyed, about 25% of the people in Japan had active TB, there was general malnutrition. But then in June 1950, the Korean war started. I was up in Hokkaido when I heard about that, sitting in a hot bath in a country inn. Our Japanese interpreter, a graduate of Northwestern and a Presbyterian minister, stopped talking to us for a while and listened to the Japanese bathers. He told us they were excited because a war had started in Korea. We were far out in the mountains and forests of this largely wild island. He said that the Japanese reported that the North Koreans had attacked and asked if that could be true? I said, “I am sure that is a wild rumor.” It took us three days to get back to Sapporo where we found out that yes, it was true. That changed a lot of things; the Japanese became a valued resource because they had the industrial manpower. They were often used illegally; they not only built the minesweepers, but they manned them in Korean ports which was contrary to the treaty. That was the beginning of the Japanese prosperity, which was also helped greatly by the war in Vietnam.

Q: If there was no embassy that you were responsible to, who was your superior?

WOODBURY: The U.S. Political Advisor, (U.S. POLAD) was its formal designation. Bill Sebald was POLAD with the rank of ambassador. He had been a naval officer before the war, a Japanese language officer, and he had made the mistake of marrying a woman who was half Japanese—her father was English. The navy was incredibly racist in those days so he was forced to resign. He got a law degree and went into partnership with his father-in-law a well-known lawyer just in time for the war. He went back into the navy then and came into the Foreign Service after the war because of his linguistic abilities. He started as the deputy U.S. POLAD. A very experienced senior Foreign Service officer, was U.S. POLAD initially. Apparently, he was one of the few FSOs that MacArthur liked or trusted so he had considerable influence. He disappeared when his plane was lost flying back to Japan from Hawaii. We never learned what happened to him. MacArthur used that opportunity to say that Sebald was perfectly satisfactory—a nonentity with no diplomatic experience. Whatever influence State Department had on policy pretty much went out the window.

Q: What was the man's name who disappeared?

WOODBURY: Atcheson, I believe; not quite Acheson. I never knew him. Sebald went on to other ambassadorships and to be assistant secretary for East Asia; he was a competent man, but not somebody who could stand up to MacArthur. Most occupation officials thought it would have to go on for a hundred years to teach the Japanese democracy and how to run trains and build ships. When people told me this I couldn't believe it. I don't have many kind words for General MacArthur but in many ways he was a great statesman. I thought Forrestal summed it up brilliantly in his diary when he first met MacArthur in the Philippines—"Enormous ability mortgaged to his vanity." That covers it, both the plus and the minus. He insisted that despite the Korean war the occupation should end as scheduled because no one ever taught a country self-government under military rule (especially under a man as authoritarian as he was). He was absolutely right; he went ahead and got Truman to appoint John Foster Dulles to get the support of the

Republicans, the Dewey-Rockefeller Republicans, which would be enough to get the treaty through the Senate. Dulles did great work on that, he had the prestige. MacArthur, always a partisan Republican, let it be known in 1948 that he would gladly take over and clean up the mess in Washington but even more openly in 1952, an unusual situation to put it mildly, shades of General McClellan!

Q: The peace treaty was being negotiated while you were there then?

WOODBURY: Dulles came out when I was still in Tokyo. George Kennan was there too. He had a famous comment which I don't think he ever put in any of his books. Any official who came to Tokyo would be briefed by MacArthur's staff about how everything was coming up roses. This went on for two days. Kennan was asked his view of the situation in Japan after his briefing and he said, “It all began to blur one chart after another; all I remember is that all the statistics and charts were going up and up and up, except that of the venereal disease rate of U.S. troops was going down and down and down.”

The occupation of Japan was a great success, I think largely due to the Japanese. They were horrible in war but they were wonderful in the occupation because when they change, they can change absolutely. As far as I know, there was never an attack on an American soldier, even in the earliest days when they went ashore with their weapons loaded and cocked. MacArthur landed at Atsugi airfield and went to the Grand Hotel in Yokohama which fortunately had not been hit by American bombs—neither had the nearby American consulate. He had a food taster there just in case. That suspicion lasted only a few days and within a week Americans were wandering alone all over that huge city.

Q: Did your work in Yokohama, being of a different nature—consular work—give you a different insight into Japan? Did you have more contact with the Japanese people?

WOODBURY: Yes, but only for business. It must be remembered that non-fraternization orders were in effect until MacArthur left Japan, long after they had been lifted in Germany. There was a constant stream of people with everyday problems especially when our

soldiers were given permission to marry Japanese nationals. In a way it was more interesting. As a trained economist, though, I worried I was wasting my time.

I was first assigned in Japan to handle natural resources; the economic counselor there, my boss, came from the Commerce Department and he addressed mainly routine commercial work. He sent the press releases of SCAP to Washington without comment or analysis. He had only one other officer working for him who did the trade negotiations; Japan could not trade or deal directly with other countries so SCAP had to do it for them and they needed a diplomatic officer for that. His staff doubled when I came on board, but he didn't know what to do with me. So I didn't have much of anything to do for about six weeks. He promised to take me over to the Natural Resources Section of SCAP because that had not been covered at all; it had agriculture, fisheries, forestry and mining—none of which were top boiler issues. My boss was so busy sending in his press releases he never got around to take me over so for six weeks I read everything; it is amazing what comes over your desk. I was learning a lot, but I didn't see much point to it so I kept after him. Finally he said, “I'm just too busy, why don't you go over and introduce yourself to Colonel Schenk,” who was head of the section.

Of MacArthur's section chiefs Colonel Schenk was the junior man, the only one who was a colonel, the rest were all major generals—and not entirely by coincidence he was the only one who had any qualifications for the job. So I went over to see Colonel Schenk who had been a professor of geography at Stanford. He was pleased that U.S. POLAD, the future U.S. embassy was interested enough to assign an officer to his section. He invited me to his staff meetings and briefing, and I won his heart at a meeting in which Colonel Schenk was explaining the basis for the land reform in Japan. A newly arrived colonel said he thought this was a terrible thing, pure socialism. In Nebraska if you worked hard you could homestead and then acquire more land than others as his grandfather had done. It was a matter of hard work and that is the way it should be in Japan. There was and is no question in my mind that Japan has (or had up to now) a conservative pro-American government because of the land reform; it was the foundation of parliamentary

government because people had a vested interest in the system. I told the colonel that my grandfather had been a homesteader in South Dakota as his grandfather had been in Nebraska but that the situation in Japan was entirely different and explained why. When they left Colonel Schenk said he was most grateful, “You explained it perfectly but I couldn't say that.” So because of that incident, I became a friend. Fortunately, civilians do not wear rank on their business suits so the good colonel did not realize I was a lowly third secretary.

Colonel Schenk later asked me if I could help get a SCAP population report released. Professor Ackerman of Harvard had come out to Japan to study Japan's scarce resources in relation to its population problem. His report stated that for the economy to be viable, there would have to be population control but he made no recommendation as to means. There was a great fuss over that comment because MacArthur had refused to let the public health officer introduce any family planning in Japan—he was running for president and didn't want that issue raised—so the whole report was ordered sequestered, fifteen hundred copies of it. I wrote a report to Washington and there was some pressure from there so they finally let the report out but they took out the addendum that contained the reference to population. I got a copy of the original report and reproduced that section for the Department. This would be just a mildly amusing story of military heavy-handedness except for one thing; when the Japanese finally did begin to control their population, to catch up with the lost years they had to resort to abortion, free and unlimited abortion; they had no experience nor training in family planning at the end of the occupation. The Japanese government is always embarrassed by this in international meetings.

It shows, at least, how much influence a third secretary can have or can't have. It took me weeks to get that report out of the office because my boss knew it was a hot potato so he just kept it in his in box. Finally he went on home leave and his temporary replacement came to me with my report and said, “Let's get it out, he isn't going to be back for two months.” So it went up to the DCM and I got called up to see him, a starchy gentleman out of the old Foreign Service. “I understand you wrote this and from your conclusion I

understand you to believe that censorship has been improperly used to keep this report from being released." I thought I was in for it but managed to say, "Yes sir, that is the conclusion that I draw." He smiled suddenly, a rare event, and said, "Well you are right, but you have got to write it more clearly so that people will understand it." That was one of my best days. So I polished it up and it went out but by this time it was too late to have had much influence. Once MacArthur made his opinions known it was like an encyclical from the Pope. At least the Pope admits that he is a man, MacArthur never did.

Q: From Japan then, you went on to the Dominican Republic. That was quite a change, wasn't it?

WOODBURY: It certainly was; that is the way they keep you off balance, I guess.

Q: That was when?

WOODBURY: I might add here that I liked Japan; the occupation was coming to an end. It ended two days after I left with massive riots. I told my wife that "when I leave everything goes to hell." Imagine having the occupation end on May Day, when all the communists were out with their red flags! It is a holiday in Japan. Only we Americans could have picked that time instead of a week later or a week earlier. It was just a "blip" it turned out, but at the time we were scared to death. The last thing in the world we wanted was to use U.S. troops to reassert control; the Japanese police maintained control and Japan was a sovereign nation again. Because I went back to Japan later I thought I had better add here that I was urged to take Japanese language specialization, but at thirty-two and having spent all my adult life either in the military or in graduate school I just didn't want to go back to school again for two years. Training in Japanese would have worked well with my economics it turned out. So to the Dominican Republic.

Q: You went there when?

WOODBURY: August 1952. I had home leave first—I had married in Tokyo, Lee came out there in October 1950. We had a time getting her into Japan because of the Korean War; it was hard in any case to get a permit for her to come to Japan to visit a single man. She got to Japan before the worst happened in Korea; for a while after the Chinese came in we were not sure we could hold south Korea and they talked of evacuating the dependents from Japan. They shortly stopped that talk because it was logistically impossible and they didn't want to start a panic.End tape 1, begin tape 2.

Q: (This continues the interview with Wendell Woodbury; the date is June 5, 1993.) To clarify the record—you were in Japan from when to when?

WOODBURY: From November of 1949 until the end of April of 1952. Then after home leave we went to the Dominican Republic.

Q: You went as an economic officer?

WOODBURY: Yes. There were three officers in the economic section and I was the junior officer. I found out, for all my economic training, that I was in charge of routine commercial work, world trade directory reports, trade lists, and that my chief was certifiably mad. It was really the nadir of my experience. The Dominican Republic was a vicious dictatorship. It was less vicious than it had been because, as a Puerto Rican friend told me, all the people with any guts were either dead or in exile. It was a very efficient totalitarian regime, in every sense of the word; probably worse than Nazi Germany except in scale. Germany was a large country and they couldn't keep track of everybody, but the Dominican Republic had only three and a half or four million people at the time of whom only ten to twenty percent were the literate middle class; the rest were campesinos, so everybody who counted knew each other. They were afraid even to think, for fear of letting it show on their faces. Trujillo was a megalomaniac, efficient and with enormous energy. He was not the typical “caudillo,” he was much more able. Most military dictators enrich their family and they are satisfied to leave with their loot.

Trujillo put his younger brother Hector in as President while he took the honorary title as Benefactor de la Patria, but he still ran everything. At the inauguration for Hector, there was a five day celebration, but the only head of state that they got to come was Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. At one of the ceremonies, I saw a jaunty, middle-aged man surrounded by people and having a good time telling stories. It seemed so “un Dominican” that I asked my Puerto Rican friend who that was. “Oh, don't you know him? That is Somoza.” He was in a business suit, telling jokes and laughing. A few minutes later Trujillo came in in his Admiral's uniform with medals and gold all over and with his fore and aft hat with plumes. Everyone fell absolutely silent. He was announced and walked in as the band struck up. I tell this story because on the way home Somoza stopped in (pre Castro) Cuba to tell the American Ambassador, “You have got to watch that man, he is a madman.” That was the difference between Somoza who was the conventional caudillo, corrupt and authoritarian, but with a sense of reality that Trujillo had completely lost.

Trujillo told one of the American ambassadors there, it may have been Ellis Briggs who loathed him, that, “It was a pity I was born in such a small country, I could have done so much for your country.”

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

WOODBURY: We had two. The first a wealthy political appointee from New York named Phelps Phelps (really). When the Eisenhower Administration took over from Truman, William Tecumseh—not Sherman but Pheiffer was named. He came from Oklahoma and was called “Wild Bill,” but he was actually a New York corporate lawyer and sometime politician.

Q: How did your political appointee get along with embassy personnel?

WOODBURY: Which one?

Q: Phelps.

WOODBURY: Well, he was basically senile. A strange old bachelor to whom Senator Lehman owed something or other. He was very naive and unknowledgeable. His whole policy was to apologize for the United States being the colossus of the north. He was an absolute zero which made it difficult for us to deal with a dictator who was extremely aggressive, shrewd and energetic. Pheiffer was an intelligent and amiable fellow who knew nothing about diplomacy and cared less. He let the DCM pretty much run the embassy but he backed us up (at least at first). Unfortunately, after I left, he got involved on the wrong side of the Galendez case—the man whom Trujillo had kidnapped from Columbia University and murdered because he wrote an unflattering book about his regime. In covering it up Trujillo's minions also had to murder the kidnappers, two pilots one of whom was American and one Dominican. It was fully reported in Life Magazine and I believe the document published on U.S. foreign affairs for those years. Pheiffer, a former congressman from Manhattan thought himself a man of the world and Dominican politics was like the Republicans and Democrats back home. He could not accept that his friends were murderous thugs.

Q: The state of affairs sounds a bit rough in the Dominican Republic. What were the main issues?

WOODBURY: Outside of the fact that we didn't like to have Americans murdered? There was another American citizen murdered earlier, an Episcopal priest who had reported about the massacre of the Haitians in 1937; 13,000 sugar cane workers were killed on orders from Trujillo. The priest made the mistake of writing to his sister about it through the open mail. He was buried in front of the alter and on Memorial Day I would have that in mind watching Trujillo's deputy, who is believed to have ordered him murdered sit in full dress uniform between the American and UK ambassadors, in the Anglican church in the capital.

Q: What were the economic interests between the two countries?

WOODBURY: Sugar, sugar, sugar. The Dominican Republic had a very small sugar quota—Cuba pre-Castro had a huge one—and that made an enormous difference in the price they got for their sugar. The other two main exports were cacao and coffee but they were minor compared to sugar. Our main concern was the treatment of American investment; the two largest sugar centrals; United Fruit's northernmost banana plantation; the telephone and power companies, the major petroleum companies were all American owned. Trujillo would harass them all intermittently to shake them down or try to buy them on the cheap. Johnson believed it was a substitute for Haiti. Trujillo was afraid we would not sit still for that.

I started out as the third man in the economic section but with the change of administration and the McCarthy period, nobody could be replaced until they had a full field investigation. They were throwing people out right and left, not for security reasons but to cut down personnel. They decimated the staff corps because they could get rid of them easily but could not fire FSO's without due cause. So I got a rapid series of promotions—my boss was finally selected out, he hadn't been promoted for twenty years—so I went from number three, to number two and agricultural attach#, to number one in the economic section and at the same time I became the junior political officer. At the very end the DCM went off to the War College and he convinced the ambassador that his replacement would be coming from Austria in about two weeks and that I could handle it until then. So I became the acting DCM and chief political officer and the two weeks stretched into three months. It may have been the nadir of my career but I have never been promoted so fast. Promoted only in title and responsibility—as Acting DCM I was the lowest paid officer on the diplomatic list.

The DCM was really my mentor in Latin American affairs and we became very close despite our very different styles.

Q: And what was his name?

WOODBURY: Richard A. Johnson, one of the Galesburg Swedes. He was writing a detailed analysis of the history and political structure of the Trujillo regime: the Trujillo apparatus, the Partido Dominicano, the extended Trujillo family and their interrelationships, how he actually operated, etc. One thing that Trujillo always did was to make sure that nobody was ever sure of their job. Even Paulino who was number two and the only one who could make even a small decision on his own, was suddenly found to be a traitor my last month there. Trujillo didn't kill them off as many dictators do; in almost all cases they were sent into exile, sometimes with jobs, sometimes not. But if they didn't complain, if they didn't try to undermine him or join the opposition, they had a chance to come back again. Johnson was absolutely fascinated by his cold-blooded Machiavellian operations.

Trujillo was, as I said, tremendously aggressive and energetic but he was stuck with this little country, sharing an island with Haiti. Haiti had invaded them twice for long periods. The Dominican Republic is a mulatto nation but they regarded themselves as part of the Spanish heritage, loyal Catholics at the frontier of western civilization against the black pagans of Haiti (who of course are also Roman Catholic). The Catholic bishop of Haiti said that the Haitians were 90% Catholic and 100% voodoo. Well, the Dominicans were voodoo too, but that was never acknowledged. Haiti was the great enemy and that was one reason, probably, that he ordered the massacre of the Haitians. He needed the Haitians to cut the sugar cane but to ease political tensions, he turned on them and drove them out—temporarily. Johnson always felt that if we didn't make our position very clear, that we would never allow it, the Dominicans would march into Haiti some day. He thought that from the political point of view that was the main danger we had to worry about.

The political problems could not be separated from the economic. The Trujillo family dominated the Dominican economy except for the foreign interests, primarily American and Canadian. Aside from the sugar companies, the American owned power company and the telephone company were the big capital investments. Johnson felt that if Trujillo

was frustrated in his ambitions to take over Haiti he might turn inward and take measures against American owned companies. I never took this too seriously because Trujillo would know that trying to run Haiti was just asking for more trouble. Johnson thought that Trujillo was acting more and more irrationally, becoming more and more of a megalomaniac. I disagreed after reading Ellis Briggs' reports from years back; Trujillo's personality and actions seemed to have changed little over the years. That was really our only major disagreement: Dick thought the “Jefe” had crossed the borderline of psychosis; I thought he was still as rational as he ever had been.

Johnson asked me if I would try to find out how much of the country Trujillo owned, how much his income might be and how much money he was getting out of the country. I found out that many of the companies that were agents for American imports were owned by the Trujillo family. They controlled one-third of the arable land. Also that the family levied a tax of 10% on all goods coming into the country, over and above the tariff. The army acted as Trujillo's police force and sometimes the work force for his enterprises. That was the atmosphere of the place. I wrote a 70 page report on all aspects. Surprisingly, most of my material came from published documents—reading between the lines of course. Johnson had hoped that our detailed studies would help any successor regime—especially the disposition of the vast properties of the Trujillo family. I have a book “Trujillo—Caribbean Caesar” in Virginia whose author obviously had access to our reports. In the “Plus ca change” department both Johnson and I knew President Balaguer when he was a “respectable” toady for Trujillo.

Q: In 1955 you went on to Algiers?

WOODBURY: Yes. I wanted a European post and they gave me Algiers. That turned out to be interesting because in a sense it was a colonial backwater, the last of the French Empire.

Q: You went out there as an economic officer?

WOODBURY: Yes, in February of 1955. This was just after the beginning of the Algerian War, on November 1, 1954. On home leave, I had seen newsreels of trucks and tanks running around in the desert, and had gotten the impression that the French had taken care of the uprising in short order. When I got there the French said that they had put it down easily, a few Frenchmen had been killed but for all that, it had been a complete fiasco, the FLN (Front Liberacion Nacional) was completely defeated.

Q: Did you have French language training before you went there?

WOODBURY: Only in college. I could read it fairly easily but it took me about six months before I could work in it orally. I do remember, “S#tif ne bouge pas,” (Setif doesn't budge) and, in English, “the Arab is like a child, when he acts up you strike him hard.” These sayings dated from the uprising on VE Day in 1945, which is why most of us had never heard of it. It was followed by savage reprisals—the shooting of hostages and bombing of civilians. Fortunately, the order to bomb Moslem towns was given by De Gaulle's communist Minister for Air, Pierre Cot, for which the FLN (the rebels) never forgave them despite French efforts to tie the rebellion to the communists.

Algiers was a quiet consulate general and Algeria was part of France in those days. The slogan of the colony was “l'Algerie c'est la France,” because it was legally a part of France. The difference was that they had eight million Moslems, mostly dirt poor and primitive, and one million Europeans, of whom the French were actually a minority. There were several hundred thousand Jews many of whom were there when the Arabs came about 800 AD. The west was settled mostly by the Spanish—Spanish was the lingua franca of the Oran area rather than French. The east, the Bone area, was predominantly Italian and Maltese. It was a very polyglot European population. The hierarchy was not based on religion or race but on the degree of civilization. The French had a civilizing mission. They were not colonists but pioneers. I have neglected the Berbers, who were pre-Arab and were about

half the indigenous population. They are not Semitic. St Augustine was a Berber, and I believe at least one Pope.

There were two electoral colleges; the first college was mostly European and the second college, mostly Moslem—the less civilized, shall we say. From the democratic point of view they unfortunately had the equal representation in Paris and in the local assembly, but a first college vote was worth eight of the second. With their superior economic clout and education, the first college obviously ran things. There were Moslems in the first college; a Moslem could join the first college if he would accept French law, basically the Napoleonic code, instead of Koranic law—there were separate systems of courts, property rights, etc. There were a number of Moslems in the first college, they called them “evolu#,” but they could only have one wife rather than the four permitted by Koranic law. There were no restrictions on mistresses.

Q: How did they determine what college you were in?

WOODBURY: It was complicated but I believe that admission to the first college was restricted by level of education (in French of course) and by acceptance of French civil law as opposed to Koranic law.

Q: Did you get a certificate or something?

WOODBURY: Yes. If you were born to French, Italian, Jewish, or Spanish immigrants, of course, you were in the first college almost automatically. It was a very complicated situation especially for mixed marriages.

Q: We had a consulate general there?

WOODBURY: Yes, but we reported directly to the Department of State, through the Paris embassy. The Consul General was an old China hand. He had been an inspector, had once had the rank of ambassador, was a career minister and was supposed to have been

the ambassador to Thailand. His name was sent up to the Senate but then there was a change of administration and “Wild” Bill Donovan, former head of OSS and a staunch Republican, wanted to go there so Lewis Clark's name was withdrawn. They offered him Burma, but his pride was affronted so he turned it down. He would have been retired but for the fact that he was a career minister. He had spent almost his entire career in China. He was a wise old man but here we had another split, a generational split. He was always looking for the middle ground, as the French were, looking for somebody to mediate between the two sides, but we younger officers believed the time for that was long past. It might have been possible to keep Algeria in the French commonwealth but the political strength of the colon made the necessary concessions impossible.

Ferhat Abbas, a moderate with a French wife, was one of the leaders of the nationalists who wanted a separate nation, but in the French commonwealth. He could have easily gotten along with the colonial French, and they could have worked out something but not as a part of France: that was an unworkable situation. When de Gaulle came in, he saw immediately that France's sophisticated and expensive social security system and its equally expensive education system could not bear the cost of the introduction of eight million poor Moslems. They were largely illiterate, had a primitive way of life and a very high birth rate. This would never be accepted by the French people. The people who wanted it, of course, were the grand colon, the big landowners, some of whom had incomes of over a million dollars a year. They had all the advantage of the high French wheat and wine subsidies. They had a vested interest in Algeria. Algeria was, however, a dreadful drain on France trying to come back after the war and with all its political upheavals. The colon and their far right allies hoped rather openly for a “South African” solution.

Q: So the consulate actually reported to Washington instead of to the embassy in Paris as one would expect?

WOODBURY: Yes, probably because it was so different; actually Paris never took much interest in us until they found out our reporting was calling the Department's long-range policy into question. The U.S. was desperately trying to keep France in NATO and nobody disagreed with that, but because of that they had accepted as doctrine the French view that the problem was soluble if they could just get enough troops over there with enough economic development. This may have been true early on but not by the time we arrived.

The revolt spread rapidly within the next year. Our consul general insisted that we travel—it was a good thing that he did because we weren't able to at the end. We went all through the east in the spring and the French had lost control (at night) of many areas we had to go through to get back to Algiers. Leon Dorros was the political officer and spoke fluent French. He was very aggressive and badgered the prefect in Constantine into admitting that there was an uprising in the north along the coast where there had never had been one before. From then on it went from bad to worse.

The FLN used terrorism very effectively to get the counter-terrorists, the French colons, into action against the Moslems. Wherever there was an incident, say an ambush, any male Moslem over the age of fifteen in the area would head for the hills so as not to get shot. Many were shot (or lynched) and afterwards it was always announced that documents had been found on them that showed they were part of the rebellion. I always wondered why they carried so many documents that would sentence them to death if they were stopped, particularly since many were illiterate. We began to keep track of this unrest as it spread. A little more than a year of that and it went from the French having virtually complete control of Algeria to their being besieged in Algiers and other major cities. They went out of the city only in the daytime and then with an armed escort.

Q: So you couldn't get out of Algiers either?

WOODBURY: Only by flying. It was slower in spreading to the west and we were able to get to Oran and other areas until just before we left in 1957.

Q: Were you doing anything on the economic side? What economic interests did we have there?

WOODBURY: We had practically none by then. I concentrated on the impact of the rebellion on the Algerian economy. As my French got better I found out that in the report of the Governor General there was a balance of payments calculated between Algeria and France. It was very revealing; it showed what it cost for the subsidies, etc., which were coming into the country from France, shocking figures. I wrote a couple of reports on that and then I made a horrendous mistake at one of the few social events that we had in those days. There I met a Madame Tixier and said, “Are you connected with Monsieur Tixier, the Director of Finance for Algeria.” Oh, yes, she was his wife. So I said, “I admire very much the fine report he publishes, the greatest mistake I ever made in the Foreign Service.

He came in later, and said she told him that I was an admirer of his. He asked me why, and I told him that I found his report very useful in understanding the economic situation. Because Algiers was an integral part of France it had taken me a while to realize that this report addressed the balance of payments between the two entities. He said, “You're right,” and that was the last time they ever published it! But they didn't need to, I had gotten the main points on the magnitude of what Algeria was actually costing the French economy. It was a terrible strain and did not count the cost of the French military. They had 600,000 soldiers there by the time we left—they had to increase the draft, call up reserve officers, pull troops out of NATO, and use American equipment designated for NATO contrary to their commitments.

Neither the consul general or his deputy understood the force of nationalism nor that this nationalism was why the French were going to lose. The French were fond of saying that there never was an Algerian nation. I always wanted to reply that there never was an Algeria until they created it by taking over in 1825 and running it as a unit. The French created nationalism and now these people from diverse tribes and peoples thought of themselves as Algerians and they were not going to be French, they didn't want to

be French. The French liberals believed that there was a middle way in which Algeria could be a part of France or related to it in some way. Lewis Clark believed that too; he thought that the moderates on both sides could get together. But the colon was absolutely adamant and they largely controlled the Radical Socialist Party, a Centrist Party that was by necessity in any French government formed. The weak French governments that resulted could not act. De Gaulle faced it by saying it was either France or Algeria and as a French nationalist, he was willing to say goodbye to Algeria—and had the strength to carry it through.

Q: Where had this situation gotten to by the time you left in 1957?

WOODBURY: Let me first finish on the subject of the split in the consulate. The consul general and his deputy were on one side while the junior officers almost entirely agreed that the French cause was hopeless. When we left, I stopped in Paris at the request of Jack Tuthill, Economic Minister there. He couldn't come to Algeria himself because the French were so paranoid about American interference. He asked me to tell him what was happening on the economic front—they had discovered oil in Algeria about this time just to add complexity. There was something worth fighting over after all. The colon used to accuse the U.S. of being after oil and I used to reply, “There is no evidence that you have any oil here.” The American, Dutch and British petroleum engineers had all assured me there wasn't any oil in Algeria, but they proved wrong as I was. The embassy had no idea of the economic impact of the rebellion and its drain on France. Tuthill wanted to see my report on this that I had just completed in Algiers.

In passing, Tuthill asked me what I thought of the military situation. I said, “Of course that's hopeless.” He jumped up from his chair and said, “What! Do you believe that?” “Of course I believe it.” “Do the others believe it.” “Lewis Clark doesn't nor his deputy but I think all the junior officers there believe it is just a matter of time, a matter of how much punishment the French are willing to take.” So he said, “I think you better see the ambassador, Amory Houghton was the ambassador then Charlie Yost was his deputy, newly arrived.

It seems that Jack Tuthill was the naysayer in the embassy. He had recently come from Germany, he had never served in France before, and he disagreed with many of the officers in the embassy about Algeria. I did talk with the ambassador and with Tuthill. Charlie Yost gave me a good cross examination but I stuck to my position. The ambassador thanked me afterwards but said that I had ruined his day. It was the first time he had heard such a negative assessment contrary to what his political section and the military attach#s had been telling him.

Q: Then you went back to Washington, in 1957?

WOODBURY: Yes, and there I took Phil Habib's place in INR. I became chairman of an inter-departmental intelligence working group on the Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive. My dislike for research as a way of life was one reason I left graduate work and it was confirmed in INR. Fortunately I was chairman and other people, mostly in State and CIA, did the research.

Q: What was your feeling in general about INR? Did you feel it was not a place a Foreign Service officer would want to be assigned?

WOODBURY: Well this was part of the Wristonization program and there was a lot of misunderstanding about it. I was recruited for the job by Phil Habib because they insisted on another economist. He was one of the very first FSO's that INR deigned to accept from the Foreign Service because of his Ph.D. in economics. As Phil said, they thought we were cocktail party types, smooth and superficial with no intellectual depth. They also insisted on high academic credentials. INR had a lot of former OSS people, it was full of eccentrics. Phil Habib wrote that I was going to have to come to the Department sometime and while it was not the most exciting job, it had substance. Lewis Clark, who was a wise old guru, said it was better to go to someplace where they want you rather than where they did not, so I accepted Phil's offer. I practically went crazy there the first few months after Algiers where bombs were going off every night and we were practically besieged.

Although considered a backwater by FSO's at that time, I met many of the most dynamic and successful FSO's there including Dean Hinton and Tom Enders to begin with.

Our first child was born in Algiers, right in the middle of the battle of Algiers. It took two French parachute divisions and a brigade of the Foreign Legion to suppress the rampant terrorism in the city. Contrary to the well known Italian movie on the subject, which was generally quite accurate, the FLN was badly defeated in the city but won the war in the countryside a la Mao. Our main worry was the curfew strictly enforced. Fortunately the baby cooperated.

This was the first time I had worked for the State Department in Washington, so there was a lot of adjusting. It was a different world. My job was more operational than research. I took over from Phil Habib, my classmate and fellow economist. We worked closely with the CIA, who did the operational part, putting out a biweekly publication and semi-annual summary. The analysts in CIA did part of it and the analysts in INR did a part, the country specialists. I worked with probably thirty or forty people every week to turn out these publications.

At that time the so-called Sino-Soviet economic offensive was considered the economic version of the domino theory. There were two approaches to it; one, that the Russians couldn't do anything right because they didn't know borsch from lubricating oil, and secondly, that they were absolutely superhuman in the efficiency of their organization—all run from station Moscow. Of course, there is a basic contradiction in those approaches but one had to live with that. I found it interesting and got to know the economic problems of virtually every developing country in the world; I also learned a lot about the Soviet Union and Marxian economics. I became known as a Soviet economic expert over the years. It doesn't take much in the land of the blind. I was approached three times to see if I would be interested in going to Moscow as economic counselor. I always used the excuse that I didn't speak Russian to which they replied that they would send me to the Bertchesgaden language school. Then I had to fall back on the fact that I was approaching forty and was

getting too old to learn a rather complex language. Of course, sometimes to friends I gave the real reason: that my wife would probably divorce me if I went to Moscow. So I never became a Soviet specialist.

Although INR tends to be one of the more obscure places in State, Douglas Dillon, then Under Secretary of State, took an active interest in our bailiwick. He set up a special advisory group and brought Phil Habib back from his overseas assignment to head it. We were doing one of the few things in INR that was top drawer for the policy makers, probably the early economic one.

Q: At one time wasn't part of INR spun off to CIA?

WOODBURY: That was part of the integration program. The biographic section was spun off because that required a rather narrow specialty and the Foreign Service officers were not particularly good at it, nor interested in it. It was transferred bodily over to CIA. Since that time I think other things have been phased out. INR was one of the children of OSS, the other child was CIA. The covert side went to CIA and the overt side initially went to State. But it was much easier to get money for CIA, especially for long term specialized research, and so I think the State Department became much more dependent on CIA after integration. We got along very well in our working group. It was a quiet four years and we became deeply entrenched in the United States again. It was a wrench to go abroad again with two small children.

Q: Did you request to go back to Japan then?

WOODBURY: Because of my background on developing countries, I was recruited as Technical Secretary for the Colombo Plan when we hosted it in Seattle. Secretary of State Dulles went out for a whole week to chair it after two weeks of meetings at the lower level. I was one of three technical secretaries under the secretary general. So I developed another specialty—in multilateral diplomacy and international organizations, and I got to see the Secretary of State close up. It was basically a British Commonwealth organization

for South and Southeast Asia. The Japanese were hosting it two years later and they asked for some help because it was the first international meeting they had hosted after the war. They were worried about their command of English and they wanted some people with experience to help out. They asked for four people from State, and particularly asked for me because the Japan delegation knew me from the first meeting in Seattle. It ended up that they only got me from the U.S. There was also a British financial commissioner from New Delhi who spoke Japanese, and an Australian and a New Zealander. We were assigned to the Foreign Office for three weeks as members of the Japanese delegation. The Japanese didn't really need much help because their post-war foreign service officers are great in English. The pre-war English of officers was generally pretty awful, even after a thirty year career because they learned their English from other Japanese. They taught it to each other so just replicated the accents and awkward usage. Now all entering officers are sent to American or British universities for two years and become very fluent but with either American or English accents.

My friends in the Foreign Office told me I was the first American since the Meiji Restoration to serve in the Foreign Office. My British colleague Stanley Charles from New Delhi and I acted as integral parts of the Foreign Office and sat with them on the dais which caused a few raised eyebrows. The Japanese did not need our help on English, but we earned our per diem by advising on Robert's Rules of Order and in an all night session helping draft the Prime Minister's speech.

As a result of this assignment through Ed Doherty, my former boss in INR who was economic counselor in Tokyo, I got to know the economic minister, Phil Trezise. I indicated an interest in coming back because I wanted to see Japan from an Embassy instead of under military occupation and my wife loved Japan. So after a quiet four years in INR, this provided an opportunity to get my foot in again in post-war Japan. As the result of my unusual assignment to the Foreign Office, I had friendly relations with several dozen

Japanese diplomatic officers at all levels which stood me in good stead not only in Tokyo and Washington but all over the world at international meetings until my retirement.

Q: So you went to Tokyo in 1961 as an economic officer?

WOODBURY: Yes, as division chief of the internal division. We did the economic analysis of Japan and conducted the diplomatic negotiations on bilateral economic issues. The first thing I got into was textiles, so that became my temporary specialty; but my primary responsibility became the analysis of Japan's economy. It was an interesting time. They were just beginning the ten year doubling the income program; this was when the tremendous rate of growth started. Trezise, Doherty and I were among the few who believed they could do it. Actually, we were too conservative. The Japanese had to revise the plan after the third year because they were already so far ahead.

Q: Was there a large economic section there at that time?

WOODBURY: Oh yes. It was one of our largest embassies.

Q: And we had large economic interests there at that time?

WOODBURY: Yes. Trade was growing by leaps and bounds and the Japanese had worrisome problems that were politically sensitive. One was cotton textiles; we were enforcing the voluntary quotas—the Japanese used to call them the “involuntary” voluntary quotas. They were right, of course, but that was the payment of President Kennedy to South Carolina and North Carolina because they elected him after Ohio went for Nixon. The other sensitive point was the balance of payments deficit—theirs, not ours. In was about $100 million a year. They complained that we wanted them to restrain their exports when there were few things they could make and sell to us. We used to tell them that they should look at the balance of payments in the context of global trade, not bilaterally; also that a country developing as fast as Japan should expect a large deficit on the balance of

payments. So they worked hard to overcome that and they sort of over compensated for it —by a factor of ten.

I used to do a briefing on the textile issues for the political and public relations types who usually are not interested at all in something as mundane as trade, except when it becomes a sensitive item between governments and peoples—in the headlines in other words. The average American had practically no interest in foreign trade, but every Japanese knew virtually everything about it and was extremely conscious of it. My complaint about our political officers was not so much that they didn't know anything about business or economics but that they said it as if they were proud of it. That attitude sometimes infuriated hard-pressed U.S. businessmen.

I have never met a Japanese foreign service officer who is not able to talk intelligently and vehemently about complicated economic issues. As an introduction to my textile briefing, to show how things turn around, I used material that my wife, who is interested in Japanese history, found and knew would interest me. During our Civil War when the cotton imports were cut off we used to import raw cotton from Japan. While I was in Japan, we were exporting huge quantities of raw cotton to Japan to make into cloth and telling them that they should not send the finished product back to us. On trade, I have always maintained vis-a-vis Japan that we were and are more sinned against than sinning but are too ready to resort to petty protectionism weakening our efforts to open up their markets.

Their economic growth was absolutely incredible; we could hardly believe it; seventeen percent for one year in real terms. I remember there was a steady change in the composition of the trade, both imports and exports, which foreshadowed future problems. We could see even from quarterly statistics how the exports to the United States were changing from conventional things like tea and raw and manufactured silk, simple machinery, etc. to much more sophisticated products. That was the beginning of what they called their star export system. Japan never had an overall economic plan like most developing countries, but MITI and the Finance Ministry would work together with industry

and the banks and decide where the credit and resources should go, concentrating on foreign trade, while largely ignoring Japanese consumer interests, a pattern that largely obtains today although it can no longer be justified on any grounds. Japan's consistent huge surpluses on their balance of payments threaten the stability of the international trade and financial system on which their prospering depends.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you were there?

WOODBURY: Edwin Reischauer

Q: How was he as Ambassador? Did he do well at running the embassy?

WOODBURY: Personally he was a charming person. At first he had a DCM, Bill Leonhart, who ran the embassy like a Navy ship. Reischauer was really only interested in the U.S.-Japan relationship long range. He was born in Japan of a missionary background—he had a Japanese wife who is a descendant of the Meiji aristocracy. He had a deep emotional attachment to Japan and I think the war must have been a traumatic experience for him as it was for the Japanese who had a foot in both camps. After the occupation ended we showed our finesse by sending out a Foreign Service officer by the name of Douglas MacArthur II; I think that was about the dumbest thing we have ever done. Many of my friends told me he was a terrible man to work for and his wife was even worse. So after them, Reischauer and Mrs. Reischauer seemed like saints. Everybody liked them, in fact he was almost revered, especially by the language officers.

MacArthur II, while unlovable was such a strong man that he made the American ambassador The President's representative in Japan rather than the commander of U.S. Forces, Far East. We still operated pre-Reischauer pretty much as if there was a senior/junior relationship. I found out recently while working on some files for publication that an American ambassador, John Allison in the 1950's, called over the senior man on American affairs in the Foreign Office to read the riot act to him regarding Japanese export controls to the Soviet Bloc. This amazed me because an ambassador always goes to the Foreign

Office; you don't call over a senior Foreign Office man to report to you. Imagine trying that with the Europeans, even a small country! The Japanese let it be known that that was going to end when Reischauer came out there. From then on only the Ambassador would deal with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and he would do the calling, not the Japanese. That is exactly what happened, Reischauer treated the Japanese as equals.

Reischauer's analysis of the political situation in Japan was that as Japan became more prosperous, country people would be moving into the cities to work in industry. Instead of voting conservative as they had before, they would join trade unions and vote for the more left wing anti-American or neutralist parties which might gain control thereby. This could bring into question our base agreements and alliance. I have been thinking a lot about what went wrong. A friend, a former FSO and noted Japanese scholar, questioned it then; he said the Ambassador was wrong. He thought the extremes, the nationalist right and the communist left would become less and less important and it would be impossible to form a government without a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party which would act as a brake on any move to the left or isolation. As it happened he was right but he has just told me that Japan still does not have a viable opposition. It is a too complicated an analysis to bring up here.

Q: There must have been a huge difference in Japan in 1961 from the Japan of the occupation, was there not?

WOODBURY: Well, they are always rebuilding Japan but the people and culture change much more slowly. It is hard to make a comparison, but I liked it much better the second time. There had been a lot of racism and condescension in the occupation. The Japanese were segregated on the railroads and other places as late as 1951 until MacArthur was relieved and Ridgeway took over. Ridgeway saw the long lines of Japanese waiting for the trains and next to them a yellow and black pipe and next to a large empty space. He said, “What the hell are these things? and was told that the empty space was for Americans. “Take them down!” was his reply; you should have heard the wailing. So all that had gone

and the atmosphere was much better. You dealt with the Foreign Office as equals, and that is very easy for Americans because they all speak good English there now.

One of our deep, dark secrets is that most of our language officers are not really capable of carrying on technical discussions in Japanese although that may be changing. I have been gone a long time.

We take advantage of that too. One of my biggest responsibilities was the Joint Annual Economic Committee meetings of cabinet ministers of both countries. That came in with the Kennedy administration; Secretary Rusk used to attend with six cabinet members with economic responsibilities. They would meet for three days in alternate capitals and discuss every subject of mutual concern. After the first meeting in 1961, I was responsible for the organization and coordination, both substantive and administrative, at the next five meetings first in Tokyo and later in the U.S. They included wives so programs had to be arranged for the spouses, and all the advisors. It got to be immensely complicated —transportation, social events, etc. Substantively, there were the briefing books and at the end negotiating the communique, always an all night session. That was a liberal education in the operation of the United States government in diplomacy. I don't think I could have recruited any of our Foreign Service officers from around the world who could have negotiated the communique in Japanese. We always did it in English and it was translated into Japanese later. So much for equal treatment; it is an enormous advantage for us to be able to do that. I had a brush with history in Tokyo in late 1963 when I was coordinating the Joint Committee meeting at that end. I had buttoned down the last loose end and had gone to bed early in preparation for the early morning arrival of Secretary Rusk and party. About 3 a.m. I was awakened by a telephone call from the head of TIME/ LIFE for the Far East asking about the effect of President Kennedy's death on the meeting. Of course, Rusk ordered Air Force One to turn back to Washington. Five of the six cabinet members were aboard.

Q: So then you went back to the Department of State?

WOODBURY: Yes, in 1964. There used to be an Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and I was assigned there as economic advisor. My predecessor was a civil servant who had been a senior official in the occupation and I was the first FSO who came back they thought knew enough about the economic side to relieve her. She went to Policy Planning. Then they abolished NEA as an office and I became a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs who was Bill Bundy, brother of “Mac”. He was never exactly fascinated with economics; a corporate lawyer, he came from CIA and the Defense Department and was deeply involved with Vietnam at that time. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was Bob Barnett and I worked for him about nine tenths of the time. Occasionally I did work with Bill Bundy on military hardware things but I tried to stay out of Vietnam, that was where careers were being made in those days and so almost everybody wanted to work on that. I thought some attention ought to be paid to Japan and Indonesia and maybe even China.

It was a fascinating but demanding job. One of the first things I got into was China. I didn't even know there was a major study project underway looking to a future opening to Mainland China. In those days you could be hung, drawn, and quartered for even thinking about it. It was one of the most comprehensive projects I have ever seen with studies on all facets. Everything was there. When the Nixon administration came in and decided to do the unthinkable—which they could being conservative—they had the scenario. Phase one and phase two, the easy things first, the harder things to follow. It never got past State at that time. CIA did most of the detailed factual research and EB did the economic analysis while we did the political spade work.

We got all the clearances at the working level except for that of Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Bill Bundy. Bob and I went in one Saturday after he had seen it for the first time and he was angrily picking it to pieces and demanding changes. Finally he said to make the changes and he would sign off on it. I said to Bob, “What is the matter with him?” “Why is he so angry?” He answered, “He signed it because he knew he should but he is angry

because he knows what the Secretary is going to say about it." So it went to Secretary Rusk and he gave it to Katzenbach who had just come in as Under Secretary and said, "Here, Nick, this is something for you to cut your teeth on."

Katzenbach had just addressed a Foreign Service Association lunch challenging us to come up with new and daring ideas, new thinking, new approaches to problems, the works. On hearing of this I said, "Wait until he reads what is in his in box." It was like handing him a live hand grenade.

I left shortly after for Denmark, a good place to hide. This was 1968. Anyway that was the last I heard of it, Katzenbach may have deep-sixed it. But it was apparently kept on the shelf, the back shelf. I can't prove this, but when I read about the Nixon/Kissinger new approach to China, it fitted beautifully. If you have a good idea in foreign affairs, never throw it away. I understand that the idea for Point Four came from somebody in the Economic Affairs Bureau who had been trying to sell that idea for years. When Truman needed something for his 1949 State of the Union speech, or Inauguration speech, he took his idea over to the White House (not through channels) and the President said, "Oh, this is a wonderful idea." So suddenly we had the President saying we were going to have a technical assistance program; Point Four because it was point four in his speech. I had lunch with Bob Barnett recently for the first time in many years (June 1994). I told him that when I read about Kissinger's bold new policy on China, the only thing that he had omitted from the original scenario was the ping pong diplomacy which had initiated it. Bob smiled but modestly refused to confirm (or deny). The China paper was probably the most important project I worked on though it didn't go anywhere on my watch. Indonesia was next. That was right after the communist uprising which Sukarno was running behind the scenes. Suharto had a division of troops outside of Jakarta which he marched in to protect the "father of the revolution." So Sukarno switched sides immediately but everyone knew he tried to use the uprising to get absolute power. Indonesia was very close to becoming a communist satellite at that time. So there were the tremendously complicated problems of rescheduling Indonesia's debts, getting our AID program going again and getting

multilateral economic assistance started. There were large debts to the communist bloc, mostly for military equipment, primarily to the Soviet Union but quite a bit to communist China. It was enormously complicated, we couldn't get the Congress or our Allies to go along with rescheduling the debts, unless the Soviets and the Chinese did. The Soviets told the Indonesians that they had to get the Chinese to make equal concessions—and they did. I suppose both still hoped to keep a foot in the door. We asked the Dutch to coordinate this; they chaired the meetings of the multilateral group of the western countries. Then when the debts were rescheduled so that debt repayment wouldn't take all foreign exchange earnings we got the IBRD, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank to help Indonesia. And it worked.

I worked on virtually everything in East Asia, but I stayed out of the Philippines; our relations there are too complicated. In many cases we acted as economic advisors to the desks, so I got involved in most countries. Bob Barnett, Bill Thomas and I were in effect the senior economic policy officers for EA except for Japan where the country director and my replacement from Tokyo ran things; but several of the country directors wouldn't touch economic issues. I didn't think ours was good organization; everything should have been concentrated at the country director level and they should be involved in all major policy matters. When I came back from Denmark in 1971, I made a recommendation that was accepted: that there be an economic policy planning office at the bureau level which could handle highly complicated technical issues that come up occasionally; integrated to do economic analysis for the Bureau, and to act as a resource for the smaller country desks. After I left for the Senior Seminar this was implemented and is still operating, very well as far as I know. So in my last five years before retirement I had the dubious honor of creating two new offices: dubious because maybe one shouldn't boast about creating more bureaucracy.

There is a basic problem in integrating policy. The political bureaus see everything from the point of view of how best to accomplish their country objectives; political-military for the most part. Japan is an extreme example—the question of keeping our bases and our

defense alliance has been the all consuming issue which has led to the current stalemate. The economic affairs bureau used to be run by specialists and had some outstanding people, but with integration the economists came into the Foreign Service and so they had to create a program to train junior officers in economics on a systematic basis.

The regional bureaus and Policy Planning often regard EB as the enemy, trying to circumvent the Secretary's, and their, political objectives. EB has to think about the domestic constituencies which are the main concern of the Congress and often the White House. Someone has to go up and justify these things to Congress. You have to have someone who can handle the special interests. It should not be two warring constituencies if both mandates are interpreted properly and both are highly political. Senior FSO's must understand both. As a Japanese FSO replied when asked why when our Embassy had fishery questions to discuss with the Foreign Office, sometimes we dealt with the political bureaus and other times with the economic. The answer is easy to remember: the political bureau handles live fish, the economic bureau handles dead fish.

That was brought home to me in Denmark when our press officer assured the Foreign Minister not to be too concerned about U.S. complaints about the Danes taking Atlantic salmon on the high seas because it was just the sport of such rich fat cat celebrities as Bing Crosby, Ted Williams, etc. He made the mistake of reporting his effort to smooth relations with the Danes as a feather in his cap. We got one of the worst blasts, quite deservedly, from Washington I could recall “to educate the embassy” that this was probably the most sensitive fisheries issue we dealt with, both domestically and diplomatically, with Japan and the USSR. Needless to say, the press attach# had never served in any other post.

Q: How did you get from East Asia to Europe—to Copenhagen in 1968?

WOODBURY: Do you want the truth? Because I couldn't get a decent job in East Asia. I was the EA candidate for a long time to be the deputy U.S. director of the Asia

Development Bank at the request of the Director because I helped set it up. Then EB came up with a candidate and Phil Habib told me, “You are not going to get that job because EA doesn't have any clout and Tony Solomon does in EB.” He was quite right, but EA hung on for almost a year keeping me on tenterhooks. I then got vetoed for the job of economic counselor in Taiwan because the Ambassador, an old China hand, suspected that I was soft on Chiang Kai-shek. I got the assignment because of a man I had never met, the personnel officer for Europe, who knew my record in EA and in Tokyo and didn't care for the other candidates for the job. Logic sometimes has little to do with personnel assignments in the Foreign Service and the “Peter Principle” is alive and well.

Q: Who was the Ambassador to Denmark at the time?

WOODBURY: Actually we had three. Mrs. White, a political appointee, was there when I was appointed. Then Angier Biddle Duke, who had been chief of protocol, wanted to go abroad again so he intervened with the President who called her up at the airport on her way back to Denmark and said, “Kate, I am afraid you are going to have to resign because Angie wants the job.” This was September or October of 1968 with a presidential election coming up in November, which you may recall, the Democrats lost. So Duke was ambassador for only a little over a month when he became a lame duck. However, he convinced himself that he might be held on by President Nixon because his name was Duke and Nixon went to Duke University law school on a scholarship. It is amusing how people can kid themselves.

Q: So you got another political appointee?

WOODBURY: Yes, a Goldwater Republican from Tennessee, Guilford Dudley. He was an international playboy and president of the insurance company that his father had founded. He brought the jet set to Copenhagen. He was a pleasant enough person but he didn't have the slightest idea of what an Ambassador is supposed to do. He was really a socialite playboy; he had an attention span of about ten to thirty seconds. His main concern was

whether to wear miniature or full decorations when he called on the King and he would not accept our unanimous view that American Ambassadors do not wear decorations on their formal wear. They do now in Denmark! I think Dudley got his impression of diplomatic life from vodka ads.

Q: Was it a large embassy?

WOODBURY: Much too large. There were one hundred Americans there but they kept cutting the State Department side, mostly economic positions. BALPA program, the balance of payments hassle, remember that? The chancery became the Copenhagen branch of GSA, the housing for USG agencies operating in Denmark and related services.

Q: What were the economic problems that you were involved in with Denmark?

WOODBURY: Most of them we caused ourselves, but we really didn't have any major problems with Denmark. That is another of my theories; I think it would be much better in small, quiet embassies like that where we have mostly multilateral relationships to have a permanent Charg# d'affaires, because most of our problems are created by our ambassadors. You don't need a great big house, you don't need a chauffeur, etc. The Foreign Office doesn't care, in fact they would rather talk with someone who knows something. I think Ambassador Dudley went there because being a constitutional monarchy, Denmark has a King and there are many people around with titles. None of them have any power whatsoever and normally the American Ambassador deals with Social Democrats. I was the acting DCM for about seven months and had to deal with the Ambassador daily. Our relations were quite cordial, but it was very difficult. He had to be in charge and make the decisions, but I had to make sure he made the right decisions since he didn't know anything about the problems. He was completely dependent on his staff. We were always walking on eggs. It was not a happy relationship to put it mildly. I now understand why the failure rate for DCMs is so high. International diplomacy is a breeze compared to internal relations with amateurs in charge.

When I learned accidentally that the Ambassador had never met the head of the Social Democratic party, Mr. Krag, who had been Prime Minister for five years just previously and was only a hair's breath away from coming back again, I asked the Ambassador if he didn't think it might be a good idea to invite him to his house so he would know the man he might well be dealing with in the near future. “Well, I asked him, and he wouldn't come!” was his reply which shocked me. I went to see the Danish national who acted as our protocol advisor and told him what the Ambassador had said and asked, “What gives?” “Did he tell you the whole story?” “He had his secretary call Mr. Krag the night before and asked him to a reception.” And the Social Democrats came back to power next election! Not that it made much difference. His relations with Prime Minister Krag could hardly be worse than with the conservative coalition that he dealt with during most of his incumbency. The Foreign Minister refused to receive him for weeks at a time, and Dudley refused to call on the career Vice Minister so we often had gridlock on urgent problems.

Q: But it was a pleasant posting, nonetheless, was it not?

WOODBURY: Of course, except for the embassy and going to work. I said that after the places I had been—the Dominican Republic under Trujillo, Japan during the Korean War, the Algerian war with its terrorism—I thought the Department was rewarding me for the past by giving me a sinecure. I found out, however, that when there is not enough to do, “the devil has work for idle hands.” I won't go into some of those details, they are too sordid. They were troubles mostly caused by just plain foolishness and lack of leadership on the part of too many of the key members of the career staff with a vacuum at the top. Speaking of vacuums, I served six ambassadors, all political. That must be close to a record. I hasten to add we never put Reischauer in that category.

Q: So from Denmark you came back to the United States and were in the Department from 1971 until you retired in 1980, is that correct? First in the East Asian Bureau as an

economic advisor and then the Senior Seminar. But most of your time was in the Bureau of International Organizations and I think that was the one you wanted to speak to.

WOODBURY: Yes. This was a new field for me, though I had been involved in a number of multilateral negotiations. I was in charge of the regional economic commissions, ECOSOC. This was just after the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly which was led by the Algerians after the OPEC embargo when the LDC's thought they had the economic and political clout to change the terms of trade and power relations with the developed, industrial countries. The LDC's thought they should have special consideration, specialized trade preferences, debt forgiveness, special access to capital, and what have you. That special session turned out to be a great fiasco for the United States because we were completely opposed to this so-called new international economic order (NIEO), as were the Europeans and Japan. We had an absolutely ambiguous position; we didn't vote for it; we didn't vote against it, we didn't abstain; it supposedly was passed by acclamation but we said no we didn't approve it. That was when I came into IO, which was not a very good time, and was put in charge of preparing for the Seventh Special Session which was to implement the NIEO. I cursed the USDEL at San Francisco for not insisting on a veto for ECOSOC as well as the Security Council.

I was outraged when I read the new international economic order. It was an ultimatum to the developed world. So that was the basic issue. Here was an opportunity to make the most important contribution that I ever could make to policy in the Department. It seemed hopeless at the time; we were just going to take another beating. The Europeans wanted to pretend they were going along with it without being committed to anything. The Japanese as usual were hiding in the woodwork being all things to all men. Then I found out that Tony Solomon, former EB Assistant Secretary who was out of the government had been taken on by EB to look at our overall commodity policy. He decided our ostensible laissez faire policy on commodities was not always in our best interest nor consistent. It had led to instability with the wild gyrations in prices making debt problems almost impossible in the developing areas because they could never count on their foreign

exchange earnings. He thought that maybe if we could compromise a bit on that issue it would be in our own interest in the long range as well as the short range to take each commodity by itself, trying, of course, to keep control of the process—not letting it imitate our own awful agricultural policy of building up butter mountains, etc. I sent that up to IO Assistant Secretary Bill Buffum saying that it was a great opening for the next special session. Why shouldn't we ride along on that idea and take credit in the United Nations for something we might do anyway! It would indicate that we were willing to compromise, to move in that direction. And we could find other things on which we could be flexible and take away the initiative from the LDC's. Some of Bill's advisors said it was premature and impractical but the next thing I heard about it was that Tom Enders had sent it up to the Secretary of State with a recommendation along these lines that interested Henry Buffum. They decided to jump on the bandwagon. He asked Alan Neidle, his senior advisor and me to work with EB on a strategy paper which became our basic policy position for the Seventh Special Session. Kissinger was convinced by a number of people that this was politically wise and would cost us very little compared to the political gain.

Of course we had a real reaction over in Treasury. Bill Simon said, “I will die first,” according to Kissinger. Kissinger said to get on with the work and that he would take it up with President Ford. Ford overruled Simon and approved this complete change of policy. Someone also in EB realized that the gold we had put in the IMF at $35. an ounce in the 1940's was now worth $350 or more. It belonged to the USG still but we couldn't use it for anything except currency stabilization and by extension economic assistance. So it was suggested by Paul Boeker of EB that we use this to give aid to the least developed countries. Kissinger was to make the big speech up at the UN but he had to go shuttle between Egypt and Israel, as usual, so Moynihan, our new Ambassador to the UN, made the speech. It was so unexpected that it took the air out of the NIEO sails; here we came up with sixty-six separate proposals, and we were willing to meet with the LDCs and discuss almost anything on their agenda. To confirm my cynicism and to my great amusement, Moynihan in his memoirs about his UN experience took virtually full credit for

this complex initiative although he had probably been completely unaware of it until he was invited to the final meeting with the Secretary.

I have managed to cover my 5 years in IO in a few paragraphs seeming to confirm the snide joke that the complexity of UN issues is only equaled by their unimportance. So to conclude, I will report on my own learning experience at high level. I was appointed by Secretary Kissinger to take verbatim notes for two of his breakfast briefing meetings, with about twenty Senators and Representatives each, followed by his final strategy meeting, before he went to the President, with Deputy Secretary Robinson, Under Secretary Sisco, Policy Planning Director, Winston Lord, Ambassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretaries Buffum (IO) and Enders (EB).

I knew the rules very well—note takers are not participants and shall not say anything. Moynihan who was new and completely unaware of this complex initiative until that day, undertook to commend Enders on his good work. Kissinger interrupted to say, “Don't praise Tom too much Pat, he's too full of himself now.” I laughed as I looked up from my notes to meet the cold eyes of Henry at about four feet distance with the most malevolent look I have ever received. I wanted to explain that no one had told me not to laugh at his jokes either. The fact that Tom Enders had worked for me as an FSO-8 in INR and Bill Buffum was my classmate probably contributed to my relaxed attitude, but I could not explain without further violation of the rules.

End of interview